Utterances of Divine Names. Many older polytheistic religions believed that by saying the name of a god it could be controlled. This is especially true in folk religions, for instance, Taoism. A Taoist priest is said to have the power to control spirits and deities by knowing the exact details of the being. Not just its name, but also its clothing, its mannerism, its smell, and even its personality all had to be performed perfectly in order to properly control the being. These are all ancient examples of the use of performative utterances, or statements that do things or cause something to happen merely through being uttered.
The novelty we find in monotheism is that God cannot be controlled because the truth of his name is beyond human’s puny minds.
When it comes to language, how does it relate to reality? Signs, sense, reference, definite descriptions or denoting phrases, definite & indefinite articles. How do we understand the sense & reference of fictional objects? What objects do their names refer to, and what type of reality do they have? How is it possible to refer to something that doesn’t exist? What kind of sense could a definite description like “the present emperor of CHINA” have since there is no denotation for “the present emperor of CHINA?” Are statements about non-existent entities true or false? How does our sense of the way language relates to reality change when we speak of the unreal? So, is sense superfluous as Russell says? Or, can sense be rescued beyond the shackles of the nominatum? This video will explore all of these concepts and is itself a sign referring to the famous Frege/Russell debate about Sense & Reference.
Frege, Gottlob. “On Sense and Nominatum (1892).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 190–202. Buy here:!
Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting (1905).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 203–211. Buy here:!
Russell, Bertrand. “Descriptions (1919).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 212–218. Buy here:!
Strawson, P.F. “On Referring (1950).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 219–234. Buy here:!
Farmer, Philip Jose. Riders of the Purple Wage. Buy here!
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In this episode of strange logic, we’re going to talk about Darrell Brooks, and why he doesn’t know how to do things with words. We’re going to talk about performative utterances.
Citations:
Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Martino Fine Books, 2018. Buy Here!
Logic is a field which studies truth and the basic rules which govern thought. This is done by positing an argument made up of a number of reasons or premises that supports a conclusion. What is the difference between deductive & inductive reasoning? What are some of their flaws?
Deductive Examples:
P1: All humans are puny mortals. P2: Philip Jose Farmer is a human. C: Therefore, Philip Jose Farmer is a puny mortal.
Inductive Examples:
P1. The last time I bought from this dealer, I believe they gave me below quality product. P2. This dealer has a high level of shadyness, over level 9000! P3. My friend claims this dealer robbed him. C: Therefore, I will not purchase illegal substance from my neighborhood drug dealer.
P1-P100: This swan is white. (1, 2, 3, 4… 100) C: Therefore, All swans are white.
Last time, we looked at the sense & reference of unreal objects like the Present Emperor of China. Of course, there is no Present Emperor of China, so any statement using the denoting phrase the Present Emperor of China is necessarily false. But, this leads to the possibility that sense & reference might be the same thing, since definite descriptions of unreal objects seem to have no sense and can’t be used truthfully in a sentence. This led Philosopher Bertrand Russell to declare that sense is superfluous and only referents are meaningful.
So, is sense superfluous as Russell says? Or, can sense be rescued beyond the shackles of the nominatum? In this video, we look at a critique of Russell’s reductionism provided by P.F. Strawson.
Works Cited: Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting (1905).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 203–211. Strawson, P.F. “On Referring (1950).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 219–234.
How is it possible to refer to something that doesn’t exist? What kind of sense could a definite description like “the present emperor of CHINA” have since is is clear there is no denotation for “the present emperor of CHINA?” Are statements about non-existent entities true or false? How does our sense of the way language relates to reality change when we speak of the unreal?
Bertrand Russell voiced by Alexander Moneypenny.
Works Cited:
Frege, Gottlob. “On Sense and Nominatum (1892).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 190–202.
Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting (1905).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 203–211.
Russell, Bertrand. “Descriptions (1919).” The Philosophy of Language, edited by Aloysius Martinich, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 212–218.
